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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DEVON BOYD POTTER, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant's statement of the Jurisdiction and Nature of 
the Proceedings is sufficient. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly suppress evidence seized 
pursuant to a warrant when the warrant was obtained after police 
entered Defendant's home and the trial court found no exigent 
circumstances to enter the home. A trial court's "exigent 
circumstances" determination is reversed on appeal only if it is 
clearly erroneous. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (1987). 
2. Should this court consider Appellant's argument that 
suppression was not proper because the evidence was allegedly 
seized independently from the illegal entry when this issue was 
not argued at the trial court. If this new issue is considered, 
it is reviewed as a question of law without deference to the 
Case No. 920579-CA 
Priority No. 10 
trial court. Seoura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 799, 104 
S.Ct. 3380, 3382 (1984) . 
3. Was there sufficient probable cause to issue the 
warrant. The Utah Court's have adopted the "totality of the 
circumstances" test in determining probable cause. Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983); State v. Anderson, 
701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1989). Deference is given to the magistrates 
finding. State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1109 (Utah App. 1988) . 
4. Did the affiant make statements in the Affidavit with 
reckless disregard for the truth, and should these statements be 
set aside and probable cause determined on the other facts in the 
Affidavit. Franks v. Delaware, 430 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674 
(1978) . 
5. Did the trial court correctly rule that the search 
warrant was invalid because it failed to describe the place to be 
searched with sufficient particularity when the address was 
incorrect, the location of Defendant's trailer house was 
incorrect, there was no city mentioned in the description, and 
there was only a minimal description of the home itself. This 
issue is subject to non-deferential review for legal error to 
ascertain whether by looking at the warrant, could the officer, 
with reasonable effort locate the correct premises to be 
searched. United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090 (11th Cir. 
1986) . 
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6. Is the Leon "good faith" exception applicable when the 
officers did not act in an objectively reasonable manner by 
entering the home without exigent circumstances, by using 
information gathered after the warrantless entry in the 
affidavit, by making statements to the magistrate with reckless 
disregard for the truth, and by presenting to the magistrate a 
facially deficient warrant. Once the underlying facts are 
established, this is a question of law. United States v. 
Russell, 960 F.2d 421 (5th Cir.), cert, denied.. U.S. , 
113 S.Ct. 407 (1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution reads 
essentially the same. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 15, 1991, an officer stopped a suspect for 
suspicion of DUI. After the stop, the obviously intoxicated 
suspect talked to the officer about leniency if he told the 
officer about a dope party going on. The suspect said that a 
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dope party was going on at the DeVon Potter residence, which was 
nearby, and that there were seven individuals at the residence, 
and they had a big bag of marijuana, and that they were smoking 
the marijuana. 
Based on this information, and without a search warrant, the 
officers forcefully entered the Potter residence and secured the 
premises until a search warrant could be obtained. Upon entering 
the premises the officers noted there were only three individuals 
in the residence, there was no visual signs of illegal 
substances, the individuals did not appear to be under the 
influence of any illegal substances, and there was no odor of 
marijuana. Before the search warrant was obtained, DeVon Potter 
asked the offices to leave but they refused to do so. 
While the officers were securing the residence, a pit bull 
terrier belonging to Brett Potter, one of the individuals in the 
residence, became agitated, and Brett asked if he could take the 
dog to his residence which was nearby. An officer accompanied 
Brett to his residence, and along the way Brett was attempting to 
restrain his dog, but the officer interpreted his actions as if 
he was attempting to dispose of something. A subsequent search 
of the area found no illegal substances. 
About two to three hours later, a search warrant was 
obtained by Officer Tom Harrison. The incident involving the 
suspicious activity of Brett Potter was included in the Affidavit 
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in support of the warrant. After the search warrant was served, 
DeVon Potter gave to the Officers a small amount of marijuana 
that was located at his residence. 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence for the reason that 
it was obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure in 
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution, and Article I Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, this motion was based on at last four main 
reasons. First, there were no exigent circumstances warranting 
the initial entry into the home, and once the officers entered 
the home they should have immediately left because it was quite 
apparent that the statements made by the DUI suspect were 
incorrect. Second, there was insufficient probable cause to 
support the issuance of the warrant because the statements by the 
DUI suspect were suspect because of his intoxication, his self-
interest in making the statements, and that the statements were 
apparently incorrect as the officers observed after entering the 
residence. Third, the affiant, Tom Harrison, made statements in 
his Affidavit with reckless disregard for the truth. In 
particular, the statements made by the DUI suspect. These should 
have been omitted because they were incorrect as the officers 
discovered as they entered the premises. And fourth, the search 
warrant was defective in that it did not "particularly" describe 
the place to be searched. The State responded to Defendant's 
5 
arguments, and also argued that the evidence should nevertheless 
be admitted under the Leon "good faith" exception. 
The trial court granted Defendant's motion on the basis that 
there were no exigent circumstances to enter Defendant's home, 
and the warrant did not particularly describe the place to be 
searched. The Court did not specifically rule on Defendant's 
other two arguments or the State's good faith argument. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(reference made the transcript of the preliminary hearing 
shall be denoted as "T", and references to the Record shall be 
denoted as "R") 
1. DeVon Potter resides at 75 West 400 North, Huntington, 
Utah. He lives in a trailer home which is the third one heading 
West on 400 North. (See T. 65 lines 5-8; and p. 52 lines 11-15.) 
2. On February 15, 1991, Emery County Deputy Sheriff Gayle 
Jensen stopped an individual for suspicion of DUI. The stop was 
made a short distance from DeVon Potter's residence. (See T. 23 
lines 2 and 3; and p. 8 line 24 through p. 9 line 2.) 
3. The DUI suspect was obviously intoxicated. Upon making 
contact with the officer, the DUI suspect began asking if he 
would get a break if he told the officer about a dope party 
nearby. (See T. 8 lines 10-14; and p. 10 lines 6 - 20.) 
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4. The DUI suspect told officer Jensen that a dope party 
was going on at Devon Potter's residence, and that they had a big 
bag of marijuana, and that there were seven individuals rolling 
and smoking marijuana joints. (See T. 8 line 24 through p. 9 
line 2) There was no big pot party going on at Devon Potter's 
residence. (See T. 68 lines 19-25.) 
5. As the officer was processing the DUI suspect, he 
noticed individuals peering out of a window at DeVon Potter's 
residence. (See T. 13 lines 11 - 13.) 
6. Officer Jensen radioed for assistance, and one of the 
officers to respond was Tom Harrison of the Emery County Drug 
Task Force. (See T. 41 lines 5-7 and lines 15-25.) 
7. The officers observed one car pull up to Devon Potter's 
residence, and then leave a short time later. (See T. 25 lines 
5-8 and lines 18-21.) 
8. Without a warrant, and without knocking, and without 
seeking independent corroboration of the DUI suspects' 
statements, and without checking the veracity of the DUI suspect, 
the officers forcefully entered Devon Potter's residence, and 
secured the premises until a warrant could be obtained. One of 
the officers to enter the residence was Tom Harrison. (See T. 13 
lines 5-7; and lines 19 and 20; and p. 69 lines 9-18.) 
9. Upon entering the residence the officers observed that 
there were only three individuals at the residence, there was no 
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odor of marijuana, there were no visual signs of illegal 
substances, and the individuals did not appear to be under the 
influence of any illegal substances. The officers were trained 
in detecting the odor of marijuana. (See T. 26 line 2 through p. 
27 line 17.) 
10. When the officers entered the residence, a pit bull 
terrier belonging to Brett Potter, one of the individuals in the 
residence, became agitated, and Brett asked if he could take the 
dog to his residence which was nearby. One of the officers 
granted permission to do so, and accompanied Brett to his 
trailer. Along the way Brett was attempting to restrain the dog, 
and the officer interpreted Brett's actions as trying to dispose 
of something along the path to Brett's residence. However, a 
search of the area by the officer revealed no illegal substances. 
(See T. 32 lines 6-14; and R. 15). This allegedly suspicious 
conduct was included in the Affidavit of Tom Harrison in an 
effort to obtain the warrant. 
11. While the officers were at DeVon Potter's residence, 
and before any search warrant arrived, DeVon Potter asked them to 
leave, but they refused to do so. (See T. 74 lines 11-17.) 
12. Officer Tom Harrison went to meet with the county 
attorney to prepare a search warrant. After this meeting, and 
before going to get a magistrates signatures, Officer Harrison 
intended to return to Devon Potter's residence. However, he 
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went to the wrong trailer home. (See T. 52 line 16 through p. 53 
line 25.) 
13. The Affidavit signed by Officer Harrison listed as 
information in support of the warrant the statements made by the 
DUI suspect. These are the facts that officer Harrison relied 
upon in obtaining the search warrant along with the incident with 
Brett Potter after the initial entry. (See T. 46 lines 6-16; and 
R. 12-15). 
14. Under the reliability section of the Affidavit, Officer 
Harrison indicated that the informant volunteered the information 
which was against his own penal interest. Under the verification 
section of the Affidavit, Officer Harrison indicated that Jim 
Ward, one of the occupants of the trailer, was a convicted drug 
user, that he had been told by others in the drug trade that 
DeVon Potter was involved in drugs, that the occupants in the 
trailer were very nervous because they were peering out the 
window at the traffic stop, and he described the incident with 
Brett Potter. (See R. 13, 14). 
15. Officer Harrison did not tell the magistrate that most 
of the DUI suspect's statements proved to be incorrect as the 
officers observed after entering the premises. Also, Officer 
Harrison did not inform the magistrate that the DUI suspect was 
obviously intoxicated, that he only volunteered the information 
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after asking the officer about leniency, and that nothing was 
found as a result of the Brett Potter incident. (See R. 12-15) . 
16. Magistrate Stan Truman signed the search warrant. The 
search warrant described the premises to be searched as "50 West 
400 North, Black's Trailer Court, single wide trailer, second 
trailer headed West on 400 North on South side of road, belonging 
to DeVon Potter." There was no indication of the city where the 
trailer was located. (See R. 10) . 
17. About two to three hours after initial entry, the 
search warrant was served on DeVon Potter, and he was told by 
the police that if he had any controlled substances he had better 
turn it over to them or they wold tear the place apart searching 
for it. At this time, Devon Potter gave to the police a small 
amount of marijuana he had at the residence. A complete search 
was then conducted by the officers, and some drug paraphernalia 
was found. (See T. 57 lines 4-15.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The initial warrantless entry constituted and violation of 
Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and his rights under the 
Utah Constitution, because there were no exigent circumstances 
justifying the entry. The trial court was correct in finding no 
exigent circumstances because there was no evidence presented 
which would indicate that the evidence might or would be 
imminently destroyed if the officers did not enter immediately 
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without a warrant. The "independent source" source doctrine is 
not applicable because the seizure was not so attenuated from the 
search so as to dissipate the illegal taint, the independent 
source cases cited by the State are distinguishable, and the 
Defendant challenged the warrant herein. 
There was insufficient probable cause to issue the warrant, 
especially when you consider the warrant was issued based upon 
the uncorroborated and unverified statements of a drunk driver 
who was trying to get a deal on his case. 
In addition, the affiant made statements in his Affidavit 
with reckless disregard for the truth in that he should have not 
included most if not all of the statements from the drunk driver 
because it was apparent upon entering the premises that much of 
what the drunk driver said was incorrect. The affiant did not 
relay these facts to the issuing magistrate. These statements 
should be omitted from the Affidavit, and probable cause 
determined on the remaining statements. 
Furthermore, the search warrant itself is facially invalid 
because it failed to describe the premises to be searched with 
sufficient particularity. The address was incorrect, the 
physical location of the home was described incorrectly, the city 
was not listed, and there was only a minimal physical description 
of the home. Also, when the affiant went to the scene he went to 
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the wrong residence indicating that there needed to be a 
particular description of the premises in this case. 
Finally, the Leon "good faith'1 exception is not applicable 
in this case because the officer did not act in an objectively 
reasonable manner by, among other things, not verifying the 
statements of the drunk driver, entering the premises without a 
warrant when exigent circumstances did not exist, by not 
immediately leaving Defendant's residence when it was apparent 
that much of what the drunk driver said was incorrect, by seeking 
a search warrant and including in his affidavit evidence that was 
obtained after the illegal entry, by not informing the magistrate 
of the discoveries upon entering the premises. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO THE DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE 
VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BECAUSE THERE WERE 
NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING SUCH AN ENTRY. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, prohibit 
"Unreasonable searches and seizures." Warrantless searches and 
seizures "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--
subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." See, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 (1967) as cited in State v. Ashe, 745 
12 
P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). Where a home is involved, the 
burden is particularly heavy on the state to show that one of the 
specific exceptions is applicable. In Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1379, 1380 (1980), the United 
States Supreme Court stated that warrantless "entry into the home 
is the chief evil against which the Fourth Amendment is 
directed." 
One of the specific exceptions to the warrant rule is if 
there are "exigent Circumstances" justifying a warrantless entry. 
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 
2032 (1971). The state has the burden of showing that exigent 
circumstances warranted a warrantless entry. See United States 
v. Cvaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983) . The state attempts to 
use State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987), as a case "quite 
similar" to the present case in an attempt to show exigent 
circumstances. In Ashe, the Utah Supreme Court did hold there 
were exigent circumstances, but the facts of Ashe are quite 
distinguishable from this case. 
In Ashe, a confidential informant was given instructions by 
the suspect to leave the suspect's residence, go to another 
residence, make a sell of contraband, and return with the 
proceeds in a few minutes. The informant then reported to the 
police. The police concluded that if they tried to obtain a 
search warrant at that time, it would take too long, and the 
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suspect would get suspicious as to why the informant had not 
returned within a few minutes, and the suspect would then figure 
something was up and would destroy the remaining contraband. 
Thus, without a warrant, the police entered the suspects dwelling 
and seized the contraband. 
In the present case, there was no indication to the police 
that if they did not act immediately, the evidence, if any, would 
be destroyed. Prior to their entry into Defendant's residence, 
all the police knew is that a drunk driver, in an effort to get a 
good deal on his case, made some uncorroborated statements that a 
pot party was going on at the Defendant's residence. In 
addition, the police indicated that the occupants of Defendant's 
residence looked out the window, and during a period of about 45 
minutes to an hour, one car came and left. The fact that the 
drunk driver was intoxicated and that he made the statements in 
an obvious effort to get a good deal on his case, should have 
made his statements suspect to the police, and they should have 
conducted further investigation to try to corroborate the 
statements, or they could have secured the premises outside while 
waiting for a warrant. See United States v. Ortega-Serrano, 788 
F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1986). Also, the fact that the occupants of 
Defendant's dwelling were looking out the window should not 
necessarily arouse the suspicion of the officers since it is only 
natural for someone to look out their window to see what is going 
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on when you have flashing police lights outside your house. The 
state asserts that in this case the Defendant, as in Ashe, had 
been alerted to a narcotics investigation. Presumably, this 
assertion is based on the mere fact that Defendant and others had 
looked out the window and saw the police talking to Sandstorm. 
This assumption would carry a lot more validity if Sandstorm was 
sent on a drug run as in Ashe. But such was not the case, and 
this is exactly the point the trial court made -- that there was 
no evidence presented to indicate that the Defendant would have 
any idea that Sandstorm would tell the police about the alleged 
pot party. 
In addition, the fact of a car coming and leaving should not 
necessarily have aroused the officers suspicion as that can 
easily be explained by the coincidental visit of a friend or 
family member which in this case it was. It is also important to 
note that the mere fact that the offense involves narcotics is 
insufficient in and of itself to justify a warrantless entry. 
See United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 482 (2nd Cir. 1990) . 
Consequently, there were no exigent circumstances. The 
police made an illegal entry into defendant's residence, and then 
illegally detained Defendant while they waited for a warrant. 
What is especially offensive about this police conduct is that 
after they entered the premises it should have been apparent to 
them that the statements made by the drunk driver were not 
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truthful. The drunk driver stated there was a big dope party 
going on with lots of people (at least seven), smoking marijuana. 
However, when the police entered there were only three 
individuals in the home, there were no visual signs of controlled 
substances or drug paraphernalia, the Defendant and the other 
occupants did not appear to be under the influence of illegal 
substances, and most importantly, there was no odor of marijuana. 
Both of the officers admitted at the suppression hearing that 
they were trained to detect the odor of marijuana, and that they 
knew the odor of marijuana, but they did not detect any such odor 
after entering Defendant's home. If there was some big pot 
party going on, certainly, the odor of the marijuana would have 
lingered in the residence. In spite of the apparent 
inconsistencies in the drunk driver's story, the police detained 
the Defendant even after being asked to leave by the Defendant. 
The state further argues that the marijuana "might quite 
literally go up in smoke" as further justification for the 
warrantless entry. This conclusion is not supported by the 
facts. Supposedly, Sandstrom told the police there was a bag of 
marijuana "three fingers deep." If this were true, it would have 
taken a long time to consume all of the marijuana giving the 
police sufficient time to obtain a warrant. 
A. The Trial Court did not overstate the Degree of Proof of 
"Exigent Circumstances." 
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The State attempts to make an issue of the fact that the 
trial judge used the word "would" in determining exigent 
circumstances and thus used to stringent of a standard. The 
state asserts, quoting Ashe, that the proper legal standard is if 
the suspects "might" destroy the evidence. This merely is a 
matter of semantics. Several courts have used several different 
words is setting forth the exigent circumstances standard, and 
they all essentially mean the same thing. In fact, in some of 
the very cases that the Utah Supreme Court cited in Ashe (in 
footnote 10) in support of its exigent circumstances standard, 
different terms are used instead of "might." For example, in 
United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1982). The 
court stated the police could enter if from the totality of the 
circumstances they believed the contraband "will immediately be 
destroyed." (Emphasis added.) In addition, the term "eminent 
destruction" was used in United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 
948 (5th Cir. 1977), and in United States v. Shima, 545 P.2d 1026 
(5th Cir. 1977), all of which were cited in Ashe. Even in United 
States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1983), where the court 
used the work "might," the court actually held exigent 
circumstances was present if the officers believed there was 
"...a substantial risk the remaining cocaine might be 
destroyed..." 722 F.2d at 522, 523 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, in viewing the totality of the 
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circumstances, there was no "substantial risk" that the alleged 
contraband "might" or "would" be "imminently destroyed." As 
mentioned, the main distinguishing fact between Ashe and this 
case which supports this conclusion is the fact that in Ashe a 
runner had been sent on a drug run, and the police were concerned 
about the runner not returning within the anticipated time. In 
fact, at least three of the cases cited in Ashe, and cited 
above, Manfredi, Cvaron, and Kunkler, all dealt with a suspect 
possibly being tipped off due to a drug runner not returning 
within the anticipated time. 
B. The Argument that the Officers Entered the Premises just 
to Secure them does not Justify the Initial Entry, 
The state also cites State v. Rocha, 600 p.2d 543 (Utah 
1979), Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408; and State 
v. Pursifall. 751 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1988), as examples of 
exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry to secure 
the premises until a warrant could be obtained. All of these 
cases can be factually distinguished. In Rocha, the police 
entered pursuant to an arrest. There was no arrest here either 
before or immediately after entry. And Mincey and Pursifall, 
dealt with a homicide or shooting on or near the residence, and 
the police were justified in entering the premises to apprehend a 
gunman or to discover other victims. The present care comes no 
where close to those types of exigent circumstances. The Utah 
Supreme Court in Pursifall held that the police could enter if 
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they "have a reasonable belief that a person within needs 
immediate assistance; or (2) promptly search the scene 
of a homicide for other victims or a killer on the premises. 
Pursifall, 751 P.2d at 827. 
The state's next issue that the evidence was seized by 
authority that was independent from the pre-warrant entry, is 
raised for the first time on appeal, and should not be considered 
by this court. If this issue is considered, this court should 
still uphold the trial court's order of suppression. 
C. The Independent Source Doctrine is not Applicable. 
The Defendant submits that even though the evidence in 
question was obtained after the warrant was served, the evidence 
was still "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" due to the prior illegal 
entry. In response to this the state has argued the "Independent 
Source" doctrine as articulated in Segura v. United States, 468 
U.S. 796, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984), and subsequently adopted by the 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986), 
and State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1988). In 
response to the Independent source argument, Defendant sets forth 
the following arguments: 
1. The seizure of the evidence was not so attenuated 
from the illegal entry so as to dissipate the taint. 
First, the seizure of the evidence was not "so attenuated as 
to dissipate the taint". Segura, 468 U.S. at 805, 104 S. Ct. at 
3385. In determining if there has been sufficient attenuation, 
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the United States Supreme Court, in a decision subsequent to 
Segura, held "The ultimate question therefore, is whether the 
search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent 
source of the information and tangible evidence at issue here. 
This would not have been the case if the agents decision to seek 
the warrant was prompted by what they had seen during the initial 
entry, or if information obtained during that entry was presented 
to the magistrate and effected his decision to issue the 
warrant." Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542, 108 S. Ct. 
2529, 2536 (1988). In the present case, the affiant submitted an 
attachment with his affidavit, and by reference, made the 
attachment part of the affidavit. The attachment set forth an 
incident that happened after the illegal entry. In particular, 
the attachment described allegedly suspicious activities of the 
Defendant's brother while walking back to his trailer. Without 
question, the affiant submitted this information in an effort to 
persuade the magistrate, and presumably the magistrate considered 
the information in making his decision. Therefore, there was 
insufficient attenuation between the illegal entry and the 
subsequent warrant, and thus, no completely independent source. 
We simply cannot let the police gain illegal entry to a home, and 
then use information gathered after the illegal entry to support 
an affidavit for a search warrant. 
2. There was no long period of time between the 
violation of Defendant's constitutional rights and service of the 
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warrant, and thus, no attenuation. 
Second, there is insufficient attenuation also on the basis 
that the illegal physical entry constituted an invasion of 
Defendant's right of privacy which was exacerbated by the 
continued occupation of the premises. And that illegal invasion 
of Defendant's privacy continued right up until service of the 
warrant. Consequently, there was no long period of time between 
the prior illegality and the warrant search. "The Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution protects people, not places," 
Secrura. 468 U.S. at 799, 800, 104 S. Ct. at 3382, and Defendant's 
personal right of privacy is what needs protecting here. As a 
result of the illegal entry and detention, the police improperly 
inhibited the Defendant's right of privacy and his right to come 
and go as he pleases. 
3. The State's "Independent Source11 cases are 
distinguishable. 
Third, the facts in Segura and Northrup are significantly 
distinguishable. In Segura, the Defendant was arrested 
immediately outside his apartment. The police then entered the 
apartment, and in the course of a security check, saw contraband 
in plain view. 468 U.S. at 799-801, 104 S. Ct. at 3382. 3383. 
In Northrup, the police actually observed drug buys at 
Defendant's residence. The police entered Defendant's residence 
and arrested all occupants, and observed contraband in plain 
view. In the present case, there were no arrests of Defendant or 
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any other occupant, and there was no contraband in plain view. 
The Defendant was simply held against his will for close to three 
hours in spite of the fact that there were no observable signs of 
illegal activity. In fact, this case is especially offensive 
because, as mentioned, when the police entered Defendant's 
residence it was obviously apparent that many of the drunk 
driver's statements were unfounded, especially since there was 
no lingering odor of marijuana. If there was some big pot party 
going on, there certainly would have been a lingering odor. 
However, in spite of this discovery, the police went ahead and 
illegally detained Defendant and his companions for close to 
three house and obtained a search warrant based on the suspect 
information. 
4. The Independent Source Doctrine is not applicable 
if the warrant is challenged. 
And fourth, and maybe most significantly, a main factor in 
both Segura and Northrup was that the Defendant did not challenge 
the warrant itself. In fact, in noting no challenge to the 
warrant, the Utah Supreme Court held in Northrup that, "Therefore 
we uphold the trial court's ruling that evidence seized pursuant 
to the warrant was admissible." 756 P.2d at 1288. In the present 
case, the Defendant has definitely challenged the warrant on the 
grounds of insufficient probable cause, the officers making 
reckless statements in support of the warrant, insufficiency of 
the description of the premises to be searched, and inclusion in 
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the affidavit of information obtained after the illegal entry. 
It is apparent that if there are challenges to the warrant, all 
of these challenges must be decided in favor of the state before 
this court can conclude that the independent source doctrine is 
applicable and the evidence in question is not fruit of the 
poisonous tree. For the foregoing reasons, and the subsequent 
arguments herein, this court should conclude that there is 
insufficient attenuation between the illegal entry and the 
warrant, and that the evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE SEARCH 
WARRANT. 
The Utah Courts have adopted the "totality of the 
circumstances'1 test in determining the sufficiency of probable 
cause to support a warrant. See State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 
285 (Utah App. 1990). This test was first adopted by the United 
States Supreme Court in the case of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328 (1983). "Accordingly, the 
magistrate must consider all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit and make a 'practical, common-sense decision 
whether...there is a fair probability' that criminal evidence 
will be found in the described place." Brown, 798 P.2d at 286 
citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. 
The Court in Brown went on to state that "the United States 
Supreme Court has stated that the veracity, reliability and basis 
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of knowledge of an informant 'should be understood simply as 
closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the 
common sense, practical question of whether there is probable 
cause to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a 
particular place.7" Brown 798 P.2d at 286 citing Gates, 462 U.S. 
at 230, 103 S.Ct. at 2328. In other words, the reliability and 
veracity of an informants statements are still important factors 
when considering the totality of the circumstances. 
In this particular case we are dealing with a citizen 
informant, and "courts view the testimony of citizen informers 
with less rigid scrutiny than the testimony of police 
informers...because citizen informers, unlike police informers, 
volunteer information out of concern for the community and not 
for personal benefit." Brown, 798 P.2d at 286. The key 
distinction in the instant case is the informant in question--the 
drunk driver--was definitely not giving information out of 
concern for the community, but was giving it to try to save his 
own hide. Thus, his statements should have been suspect from the 
beginning by the police. However, instead of attempting to 
verify the statements, or seek independent corroboration (as the 
police did in Brown and Gates), the police simply took the 
statements completely at face value and mainly based their 
subsequent actions of making an illegal entry and obtaining a 
warrant on the drunk driver's statements. 
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Gates and Brown can easily be distinguished from the present 
case, because in each of those cases the police took their time 
to seek independent verification of citizen informants' 
statements. And the citizen informants in question were not even 
drunk or trying to obtain leniency. In Brown, "the officers went 
to the addresses identified and verified the details of the 
houses and greenhouse identified by the informant," and "The 
officers personally verified all of the information that could be 
verified by observation..." Brown, 798 P.2d at 287. In Gates, 
"police corroborated the name and address of one of the 
defendants and substantially corroborated the defendants' modus 
operandi by observing their activities." Gates, 462 U.S. at 226, 
103 S.Ct. at 2325. 
The significant point in this case is that not only should 
the drunk drivers' statements have been suspect from the 
beginning, but they should have been thoroughly discounted when 
it became apparent to the officers that the statements were 
incorrect after they entered the Defendant's home and discovered 
no evidence of a big pot party. 
In light of the highly suspect nature of the drunk driver's 
statements, there should be no question that there was 
insufficient probable cause to issue a warrant. The only other 
factors set forth in the Affidavit are the incident with Brett 
Potter and the dog, uncorroborated statements by police 
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informants that the Defendant was in the drug trade, the 
occupants of the trailer peering out the window, and that one of 
the occupants of the trailer peering out the window, Jim Ward, 
had previously been convicted of drug use. It should be 
remembered that the police discovered no illegal substances as 
the result of the incident with Brett. Also, it is only natural 
for people to look out their windows to see what is going on when 
you have a police car with its lights flashing near your house. 
And furthermore, just because a person has been previously 
convicted of drug use, does that mean that everywhere he goes 
drugs are being used? In light of the totality of the 
circumstances as they really were, and as they should have been 
explained to the magistrate, there was insufficient probable 
cause to issue the search warrant. 
POINT III 
AFFIANT MADE STATEMENTS IN THE AFFIDAVIT WITH RECKLESS DISREGARD 
OF THE TRUTH, AND THOSE STATEMENTS SHOULD BE SET ASIDE AND 
PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINED ON THE OTHER INFORMATION IN THE 
AFFIDAVIT. 
"In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978), 
the United States Supreme Court held that where a defendant shows 
by a preponderance of the evidence that affiant made a false 
statement, intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard 
for the truth, the false material must be set to one side and 
probable cause determined by the affidavit's remaining contents." 
Brown, 798 P.2d at 288. "If the remaining content is 
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insufficient to establish probable cause, the warrant must be 
voided." Brown. 798 P.2d at 288. 
In the present case, the affiant, officer Tom Harrison, made 
statements in the affidavit with reckless disregard for the truth 
in that he included the statements of the drunk driver, and this 
was after officer Harrison had personally observed no evidence of 
any pot party going on at the Defendant's residence. Defendant 
submits that it would have made a significant difference to the 
magistrate if he knew that there were only three individuals in 
the residence, there was no lingering odor of marijuana, there 
were no visual signs of controlled substances, and none of the 
individuals appeared to be under the influence of illegal 
substances. Officer Harrison did not make these facts known to 
the magistrate, and he did so with reckless disregard for the 
truth. 
By excluding the statements of the drunk driver from the 
affidavit, there is no question that there is insufficient 
probable cause to issue a warrant. The only remaining factors 
are the incident with Brett Potter, the peering out the window, 
the uncorroborated statements of other police informants, and the 
fact that one of the occupants had previously been convicted of 
drug use. As set forth above, these facts do not constitute 
probable cause. 
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POINT IV 
THE SEARCH WARRANT IS DEFECTIVE ON ITS FACE BECAUSE IT DID NOT 
PARTICULARLY DESCRIBE THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, require that "no 
warrants shall issue...without particularly describing the place 
to be searched..." The general rule is that "under the Fourth 
Amendment, a search warrant sufficiently describes the place to 
be searched if the officer with a search warrant can, with 
reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place to be 
searched." See United States v. Vaughn, 830 F.2d 1185, 1186 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) . 
In the instant case the warrant did not describe the 
defendant's residence with particularity, and there is serious 
doubt whether an officer could have ascertained the place to be 
searched. The warrant described the place to be searched as "50 
West 400 North, Blacks Trailer Court, Single wide trailer, second 
trailer headed West on 400 North on South side of road, belonging 
to DeVon Potter." First, the warrant did not set forth a city, 
only street coordinates. The street address could very well be 
in other towns such as Castle Dale, Orangeville, and Ferrin. 
Second, the street address itself is wrong. The Defendant lives 
at 75 West 400 North, and not 50 West 400 North. Third, the 
Defendant's trailer is the third one heading West on 400 North, 
not the second one. And fourth, there evidently was some mix up 
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as to which trailer belonged to the Defendant as evidenced by 
Officer Harrison initially going to the wrong trailer. 
Therefore, the requirement of particularity was not met, and the 
search warrant should be voided. 
The cases cited by the state in support of its argument that 
there is sufficient particularity are easily distinguishable. In 
United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090 (11th Cir. 1986), the 
warrant gave a detailed description of the apartment to be 
searched. It described the dwelling as "38 Throop St., is a two-
story red brick building, trimmed in a reddish brown paint with a 
shingled roof and three adjacent apartments with apartment 840 
being the far left apartment at the address looking at it from 
the front." 784 F.2d at 1091. Even though the street address 
was wrong, it is no wonder with that detailed of a description 
that the court held there was sufficient particularity. In the 
present case, there was no such detailed description. The only 
description of the residence itself was "single wide trailer." 
Defendant's trailer was in a trailer court and there was probably 
lots of single wide trailers. In State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 
1099, 1102-1103 (Utah 1985), there was also a detailed 
description of the enclosure by Defendant's home to be searched. 
Even so far as describing the material the fence was made of 
around the enclosure. And in State v. Mclntire. 768 P. 2d 970 
(Utah App. 1989), this court looked to the affidavit for 
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clarification of the description. In the present case, there is 
no such clarification because the description in the warrant is 
exactly the same as in the affidavit. 
One of the many deficiencies in the description is the city 
was not mentioned. It has been held that failure to allege the 
city is not fatal. See, State v. LeFort, 248 Kan. 332, 806 P.2d 
986 (1991). However, this was because of the considerable 
"detail on the face of the warrant describing the place to be 
searched, including the street address, the type of construction 
and color of the house, the particular outbuildings described and 
ownership specified." 806 P.2d at 990. Here we don't have such a 
specific description to salvage the warrant. There is simply no 
way that an officer looking at this warrant could with reasonable 
effort ascertain the place that was intended to be searched. The 
state asserts that the reasonable effort analysis is satisfied 
because, "The officer knew, all along, the correct location of 
the home." (Appellant's brief p. 17.) This is not true as 
evidenced by the fact that the officer who was the affiant and 
who served the warrant admittedly went to the wrong trailer when 
he first went to the scene, and this happened in spite of the 
fact that the police supposedly had Defendant's house under 
constant surveillance. 
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POINT V 
THE "GOOD FAITH" EXCEPTION OF LEON IS NOT APPLICABLE. 
Finally, the state attempts to vindicate the violation of 
the Defendant's constitutional rights by citing the "good faith" 
exception set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 
S.Ct. 3405 (1984). The state has the burden of showing the 
necessary elements of this good faith exception. State v. 
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) . The applicability of the good 
faith exception is conditional upon the officers acting "in an 
objectively reasonable manner." The officers did no act in an 
objectively reasonable manner in this case in that they did not 
take any measures to independently verify Sandstrom's specific 
statements before entering the trailer. In addition, they went 
ahead and based the affidavit primarily on Sandstrom7s statements 
which they previously had some indication were not true because 
of the officers' observations when they entered the trailer. The 
officers admitted under oath that there were no observable signs 
that what Sandstrom had said was true. The exclusionary rule is 
designed to deter police misconduct." Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 104 
S.Ct. at 341. This deterrent purpose is not served when the 
police acted reasonably and the only mistake is some defect in 
the warrant such as an erroneous finding of probable cause by the 
magistrate which was the case in Leon. In United States v. 
Vasey, 834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987), the prosecution also raised 
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the good faith exception. In holding that the good faith 
exception was not applicable, the court distinguished its case 
from Leon in the following manner. 
The instant case differs. Officer Jensen conducted an 
illegal search and represented tainted evidence obtained in 
this search to a magistrate in an effort to obtain a search 
warrant. The search warrant was issued, at least in part, 
on the basis of this tainted evidence. The constitution 
error was made by the officer in this case, not by the 
magistrate as in Leon. The Leon court made it very clear 
that the exclusionary rule should apply (i.e. the good faith 
exception should not apply) if the exclusion of evidence 
would alter the behavior of individual law enforcement 
officers or the policies of their department. (Cases 
omitted) Officer Jensen's conducting an illegal warrantless 
search and including evidence found in this search in an 
affidavit in support of a warrant is an activity that the 
exclusionary rule was meant to deter. 834 F.2d at 789. 
See also, United States v. Scales, 903 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1990), 
wherein the defendant's suit case was seized without a warrant 
and then held until a warrant could be obtained. The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that Leon did not apply using the 
same rationale as in Vasey. 
The present case is almost exactly like Vasey. We have 
prior police miscondujt in the illegal entry and the inclusion in 
the affidavit of tainted evidence obtained after the illegal 
entry. 
This is certainly a case where the officers acted 
unreasonably, and by suppressing the evidence in this case the 
Court can serve the purposes of the exclusionary rule and deter 
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future inappropriate conduct by indicating to the police that 
they simply cannot enter a person's home without a warrant unless 
there are substantial exigent circumstances, and that they cannot 
base a warrant simply on the unverified statements of a drunk 
driver, and that they cannot obtain a warrant after discovering 
that much of what the drunk driver has said is incorrect and then 
not relaying that information to the issuing magistrate. The 
Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that "exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police 
violations of article I, section 14." State v. Lorocco, 135 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 16, 25 (Utah 1990). This is one of those cases in 
which exclusion of the evidence is a necessary consequence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the fact that Defendant's constitutional rights 
were violated by the illegal entry, and because of the 
deficiencies in the warrant as set forth above, Defendant 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's 
order of suppression. 
Respectfully submitted this ^- day of February, 1993. 
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